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* now back at U.S.T.O., De´partement de Physique, L.E.P.M., B.P.1505
El M’Naouar, Oran, Algeria.
Abstract
This third part of the lecture series deals with the question: Who
will pay for your retirement? For Western Europe the answer may be
“nobody”, but for Algeria the demography looks more promising.
1 Introduction
During the last two centuries in peaceful rich countries, people lived on av-
erage longer and longer, while during the last few decades the number of
chidren born per women during her lifetime has sunken below the replace-
ment rate of slightly above 2. Also in many poorer countries the number of
births has fallen and the life expectancy increased. Thus the fear of over-
population of our planet Earth has to be modified by fear of old-age poverty:
In the year 2030 only those goods and services can be consumed by retired
people which have been produced by working-age people. A million dollars
of old-age savings can be halved by a ten-percent inflation rate over seven
years, if not enough young people help me to live. This Econosociobiophysics
problem is one of demography, not of money.
We present in an appendix details of the assumptions for our extrapo-
lations into the future. In the next section we deal with conditions as are
typical for Western Europe, to be followed by a section on the different prob-
lems of Algeria. More literature on ageing models, including one applied to
our demography [1], is given in [2].
2 Western Europe
Around 1970, the contraceptive pill reduced in the then two German states
the average number of babies born by a women during her lifetime below the
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Figure 1: Ratio of number of pensioneers to number of working age people
(+) and ratio of number of pensioneers plus number of children to working
age people (x,*). The curves (+,x) take into account a net immigration of
0.38 percent per year and an increase of the average retirement age by half
of the previous increase of the life expectancy. (Western Europe)
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replacement level of two, to about 1.4. Spain and Italy followed later but
levelled at a lower plateau, while in France the number is higher, about 1.7.
Life expectancy rises further though slower than during the first half of the
20th century. Thus if people retire at an age of about 62 years, and if around
2030 the strongest age cohort in Germany are the 70-year olds, problems lie
ahead. Only in recent years were they discussed in general newspapers. As
in science in general, we need open publications of extrapolation methods
and results. Only if many different simulations are compared can we see to
what extent they agree and thus may be relied upon.
The top curve in Fig.1 shows what happens if nothing is done: The aver-
age retirement age is 62 years, and immigration and emigration cancel each
other. Then [3, 4, 5] the number of old people to be supported by working-
age people will increase drastically, while the total population will decrease.
We added here the number of children (up to age 20) to the pensioneers since
both groups are not fully ”working” in the usual sense. For the middle curve
we assumed a net immigration of 0.38 percent per year, starting now, and
an increase of the retirement age by about half of the increase of the life
expectancy. Thus for every year which medical progress gives us, about six
month are given like a tax to the labour market, while the other six months
are leasure time after retirement. Now the ratio and the population are more
stable. If we do not count in the latter simulation the children (bottom
curve), then the ratio of pensioneers only to working age people is lower [5].
However, the reduction of the expenses for children is mainly an effect of the
past, not of the future.
3 Algeria
During the first half of the previous century, the fertility was very large in
North Africa compared to Europe. It reached the value 8.1 during the sev-
enties in Algeria because of a low average age of marriage in this country.
Thirty years later, the average number of births per women (during her life-
time) becomes close to 2, whereas in France the fertility needed two centuries
to pass from 6 in the middle of the 17th century to 2 in the 1930’s. Algerian
people are thus young.
Figure 2 shows that the number of children (up to age 20) added to
the pensioneers (the retirement age in Algeria is 60 years) obliged workers
to support about two times their number until the year 2000. Sixty years
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Figure 2: Ratio of number of pensioneers to number of working age people
(+) and ratio of number of pensioneers plus number of children to working
age people (x). (Algeria)
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Figure 3: Ratio of number of babies died before reaching the age one year to
number of total birth(+) (data of the National Office of the Statistics ONS
Algeria) the fit line shows fractions increase of about 20 percent from 1980
until 1901.
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afterwards the population will be older but the fractions remain constant
(no fear of increasing). We assumed in Fig.2 the Gompertz slope b (see
appendix) to increase with time from 0.07 in 1901 to 0.082 in 1971 and to
remain constant thereafter. Only fertility data from 1950 on is available in
Algeria. The fertility is constant with a mean value of 7.3 from 1950 to 1980
and then decreases abruptly til 2004 to reach a value 2.04; it is assumed to
stay constant at this value thereafter. The sixty years period necessary to
reach the steady state, corresponds to the age of retirement. In figure 3, we
show that the ratio of the number of babies dying in their first year to the
total number of births decreased by about 20 percent from 1901 to 1980.
Thus, we made a correction on the fertility data (in fig.2) by reducing them
by the number of children dying before they reach maturity. We noticed
also that the greatest emigration rate of Algerian people was between 1950
and 1970 but remains weak compared to the rate of births and does not
influence the population evolution. In our simulation we then neglected the
emigration in such calculations. However, this simulation did not account
the rate of unemployeds which was very small during the period of socialism
but reaches now 17 percent of population. However, the main prediction of
Fig. 2 is an increase of the social load for old age by 400 percent starting
from 2020, while that for children and old age combined will stabilize at the
level around the year 2000.
4 Summary
With rising life expectencies and falling births, the demographic problems of
rich countries can be alleviated by controlled immigration and a moderate
increase of the average retirement age. That policy requires that first the
unemployment is reduced appreciably. For Algeria, on the other hand, em-
igration could not affect sensitively the evolution of pensioneers, but their
rate should be multiplied by a factor four after 15 years from now on which
would create a real economic problem were it not offset by a reduction of the
number of children.
LZ thanks the DAAD for supporting a one-year part of his thesis work
in Cologne. We thank W.J. Paul for suggesting to add the children to the
pensioneers.
6
5 Appendix
According to the Azbel lectures at this seminar, in all different countries and
centuries, the probability of humans to survive up to a fixed age is a universal
function of the life expectancy; we do not have to apply this universality to
yeast cells for the purpose of human demography. Thus we use Germany as
typical Western European country, without taking into account the effects of
World War II.
The mortality function µ = −d lnS(a)/da, where S(a) is the number
of survivors from birth to age a, is assumed to follow a Gompertz law for
adults: m ∝ b exp[(a−X)b] since the deviations at young age occur at such
low mortalities that they are not relevant if we want to be accurate within
a few percent. The deviations at old age [6] are not yet reliably established
and may also be negligible as long as the fraction of centenarians among
pensioneers is very small.
The Gompertz slope b was assumed to increase linearly with time from
0.07 in 1821 to 0.093 in 1971 and to stay constant thereafter, in contrast
to Bomsdorf [3] and Azbel [7] but in agreement with Yashin et al [8]; see
also Wilmoth et al [9]. Instead, the characteristic age X was constant at
103 years until 1971 and then increased each year by 0.15 years to give a
rising life expectancy. Also these deviations from universality are not yet
established reliably. (Therefore we ignored the effect for Algeria, keeping
X = 103 constant there.)
Babies are born by mothers of age 21 to 40 with age-independent prob-
ability. The average number of children born per women over her lifetime
and reaching adult age is assumed to be 2.2−0.4 tanh[(t−1971)/3] recently.
Immigrants are assumed to be 6 to 40 years old with equal probability, and
their number per year equals a fraction c = 0.38% of the population, adjusted
to give a constant total population.
After the year 2010, the retirement age is increased by 60 percent of the
increase of life expectancy at birth to 73 in 2100 at a life expectancy then of
99 years; for the problem year 2030 these ages are 64 and 84 years.
The program is available from stauffer@thp.uni-koeln.de as rente16.f.
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